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Investment Treaties and the Internal Vetting of Regulatory Proposals: A Case Study
from Canada
Gus Van Harten and Dayna Nadine Scott
Introduction
Do trade agreements and investment treaties that allow for investor-state dispute
settlement (ISDS) lead to regulatory chill? Some researchers express the concern that
ISDS creates incentives for states to avoid or modify their regulatory decisions because
of a risk of foreign investor claims and monetary awards.1 The fear is usually linked to
the exclusive access of foreign investors to ISDS, the inability of states to bring claims
against foreign investors, the breadth of foreign investor protections in ISDS, the
weaknesses of exceptions to protect the right to regulate, the ability of foreign investors
to receive uncapped amounts of compensation from the state, the international
enforceability of ISDS awards, or the absence of conventional judicial safeguards in
ISDS.2 The fear is also raised often in the context of health and environmental decisionmaking.3 Concerns about regulatory chill point to the broader issue of how legal
constraints and litigation risk affect the state’s regulatory enterprise by restricting policy
space and raising public costs of state activities.4
In this paper, we report empirical findings on ISDS and regulatory chill. Our study
focused on whether ISDS contributed to changes in internal vetting of government
decisions related to environmental protection in the province of Ontario, Canada. Our
main source of information was 51 interviews, conducted on a confidential basis with
insiders, mostly current or former officials in ministries with an environmental or trade
mandate. We aimed to advance understanding of litigation risk and government
decision-making in general with a particular focus on ISDS.5 Our first set of findings are
as follows:6

J. Clapp, “Global Environmental Governance for Corporate Responsibility and Accountability” (2005)
5:3 Global Environmental Politics 23; C. Tollefson and W.A.W. Neilsen, “Investor Rights and Sustainable
Development” in K. Gallagher, ed., Handbook on Trade and the Environment (Cheltenham, Edward
Elgar: 2008); S. Clarkson and S. Wood, A Perilous Imbalance: The Globalization of Canadian Law and
Governance (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010).
2 G. Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford: OUP, 2007), ch 5 and 7.
3 K. Tienhaara, The Expropriation of Environmental Governance (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), ch 8; K.
Cooper et al, “Seeking a regulatory chill in Canada: The Dow AgroSciences NAFTA Chapter 11 Challenge
to the Québec Pesticides Management Code” (2014) 7(1) Golden Gate University Environmental Law
Journal 5.
4 T. Prosser, The Regulatory Enterprise (Oxford: OUP, 2003); J. Braithwaite and P. Drahos, Global
Business Regulation (Cambridge: CUP, 2000).
5 D. Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investment Rules and Democracy’s
Promise (New York: CUP, 2008).
6 We plan to report additional findings in further publications.
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1. Government ministries have changed their decision-making to account for trade
concerns including ISDS.
2. Government lawyers play a key role in assessing trade and ISDS risks.
3. The Ontario trade ministry has pushed to expand a centralized regulatory
assessment process for evaluating proposed government decisions for trade and
ISDS risks.
4. Some insiders saw the trade ministry and the regulatory assessment process as
creating undesirable obstacles for environmental decision-making.
5. A ministry’s concern for trade and ISDS was more acute after the ministry was
drawn into a NAFTA case although institutional learning about ISDS appeared to be
variable and intermittent.
6. Officials typically declined to discuss specific cases or decisions.
7. Officials referred occasionally to specific situations where trade or ISDS concerns
were considered and, in some cases, where they led to changes to a proposal.
These findings are not exhaustive and will be supplemented by more detailed findings
that are flagged in the conclusion to this article. We stress also that the context of
Ontario, Canada, may differ significantly from other jurisdictions. Even for Ontario, the
findings are not comprehensive; we think they are best viewed as investigative
revelations emerging from somewhat scattered insider perspectives. The perspectives
were somewhat scattered because some officials contacted for an interview did not
accede and those who did accede worked in different contexts of government. We have
exercised caution in presenting the findings by emphasizing observations that were
supported by multiple interviewees and by prioritizing the direct reporting of
interviewee statements in order to allow the reader to evaluate support for each finding.
I. Background
A. The context of Ontario, Canada
Ontario is the largest province in Canada. It has significant foreign ownership of its
economy, which mixes manufacturing, services, resources, and agriculture. As part of
Canada’s federalist system, Ontario has its own legislature and government.7 Various
ministries have a role in environment-related decision-making, including the ministries
To preserve the confidentiality of interviewees, the environmental commissioner’s office is called a
ministry here although it is in fact a government agency.
7
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of agriculture, environment, energy, natural resources, northern development and
mines, and the environmental commissioner’s office. We interviewed officials in four of
these ministries and at the provincial trade ministry, then called the Ministry of
Economic Development and Trade.
Canada has had relatively high exposure to ISDS claims. It is the only Western country
to have accepted ISDS comprehensively with the U.S. and thus to have subjected a very
large part of its foreign-owned economy to ISDS. Canada has been in this position for
two decades under the North American Free Trade Agreement.8 NAFTA entered into
force in 1994, a few years before the explosion of ISDS claims by foreign investors in the
late 1990s began.
Since 1997, Canada has been sued 36 times in ISDS under NAFTA, in all but one
insignificant case by U.S. investors.9 Of the 36 cases, the federal trade department
reports that 16 were withdrawn or abandoned, although some of these cases appear to
have led to a confidential settlement with the foreign investor. Another 13 of the 36
cases were resolved in an ISDS adjudicative process with a mixed record for Canada of
six wins and seven losses (based simply on whether or not compensation was paid or
ordered for the foreign investor).10 The other 6 of the 36 ISDS cases are ongoing.11 Of the
36 cases not withdrawn or inactive, 4 cases involved challenges to Ontario decisions. Of
those, one was won by Canada and one was lost – based on an apparent monetary
settlement paid by Ontario – and two are ongoing.12
Some aspects of this context appear to raise the likelihood of regulatory chill linked to
ISDS. Canada has been exposed to ISDS with the U.S. for about 20 years and Ontario
has made decisions aimed at environmental protection that have led to ISDS claims
against Canada.13 From 2003 to 2008, in the Ontario Liberal government’s first five
years in office, Ontario pursued an ambitious environmental protection agenda.14
Further, the Ontario government is large and well-funded and therefore presumably
well-informed about ISDS. Yet other aspects appear to reduce the likelihood of
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
For a list of NAFTA Chapter 11 cases against Canada, see http://www.international.gc.ca/tradeagreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/gov.aspx?lang=eng (Foreign Affairs, Trade,
and Development Canada) (last accessed 4 November 2015).
10 Ibid. Cases subject to a formal process in which Canada did not pay compensation: Centurion;
Chemtura; Dow AgroSciences; Gallo; Merrill & Ring; UPS. Cases in which Canada did pay compensation:
AbitibiBowater; Bilcon; Ethyl; Murphy/ Mobil Oil; Pope & Talbot; SD Myers; St Marys.
11 Ibid. e.g. Eli Lilly; Lone Pines. The 6 ongoing cases mentioned here do not include 2 new claims by
Murphy/ Mobil Oil that are also ongoing but connected to the claimants’ win in an earlier case.
12 Ibid. The cases involving Ontario are Gallo; Mesa Power; St Marys; Windstream.
13 The cases involved a proposed landfill (Gallo), a proposed quarry (St Marys), and the implementation
of the Green Energy Act (Mesa Power and Windstream Energy).
14 M. Winfield, Blue-Green Province: The Environment and the Political Economy of Ontario (UBC
Press, 2012). Several interviewees pointed to examples of regulatory efforts during this period, such as the
government’s decisions to phase out coal power, enact a greenbelt conservation plan, raise drinking water
standards, enact green energy legislation, and restrict cosmetic use of pesticides.
8
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regulatory chill. Ontario’s decisions have not led to a large number of ISDS cases or to a
loss in an actual award. Ontario’s decisions have not led to cases as that are as high
profile as in other Canadian jurisdictions.15 Canada has a well-established court and
tribunal system that allows for independent dispute resolution between businesses and
government. According to various interviewees, provincial officials tend to assume that
trade and ISDS concerns are a federal not a provincial responsibility. Finally, according
to a few interviewees from outside Ontario, Ontario’s size may make it less sensitive
than other provinces to pressures linked to trade and ISDS.
B. Method
We did 52 interviews with persons inside and outside government, focusing on current
or former government officials.16 Interviewees were contacted through past contacts and
snowballing, cold-call invitations in relevant ministries, and a few interviews responding
to access-to-information requests in two provinces other than Ontario.17 Our cold-call
invitations were sent systematically to officials in mid-level management positions and
were designed to counteract possible selection bias in snowballed interviews. They made
up about one third of total interviews.
The interviews were semi-structured and open-ended. We tried to engage interviewees
in conversation. Typically we began with general questions about litigation risk in
government and then proceeded to more specific questions about ISDS or ISDS-related
situations. We did not press for details about specific situations and conveyed that our
priority was to make general findings, not to question individuals’ or organizations’
choices in specific cases. Our general rubric of questions was as follows. What is your
professional background? What is your role in government decision-making? Are you
familiar with issues of litigation risk (possible prompt: judicial review, constitutional
challenges, trade challenges)? Alternatively: do you deal with lawyers inside
government? How does government account for litigation risk? Does your work involve
any trade or investment agreements (possible prompt: NAFTA or the World Trade
Organization (WTO))? Does your work involve investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS),
also known as investment arbitration or NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration? Have you heard
of any ISDS or NAFTA cases (possible prompt: mention specific cases that appear
relevant). After explaining in more detail how ISDS works, for those not familiar with it,
and how its monetary remedy differs from judicial review or the WTO: do you think

Higher profile cases have involved the federal government (Eli Lilly; Ethyl; SD Myers); Newfoundland
and Labrador (AbitibiBowater); Nova Scotia (Bilcon); and Quebec (Lone Pines).
16 Ten interviews involved foreign jurisdictions and were treated as peripherally relevant. They were
reviewed to ensure no direct contradictions with the findings reported here. However, no corroborating
statements were added from these interviews because there was not as in-depth a background review of
each jurisdiction.
17 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 4, 12.
15
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risks of ISDS affect government decision-making? Questioning could vary, especially if
it was evident that the interviewee had good knowledge of ISDS.18
Between them, the researchers have expertise in trade law, ISDS, and health and
environmental regulation. Both researchers were present in the interviews except where
scheduling made this unfeasible. Both researchers reviewed all interview transcripts and
discussed their observations. Transcripts were also reviewed systematically by a
research assistant to identify themes and findings.19 When weighing information,
several issues were considered; most importantly, more weight was put on unprompted
statements that appeared to be unconnected to prior judgments on trade or ISDS and
more weight was put on statements by persons who had direct government experience.
Interviews were premised on broad confidentiality assurances in order to encourage
participation and candid discussion. As a result, all findings are reported on an
anonymous basis. We have avoided identifying any specific ministry, position, or role of
an official to prevent other insiders from identifying interviewees. Footnotes are used to
identify statements originating from the same interviewee.
Our most reliable findings, though tentative, are for Ontario government decisionmaking on environmental issues. In total, 20 interviewees had insider experience in four
relevant ministries and another 11, including 6 from health or environmental
organizations and 5 who were trade lawyers or business representatives, had relevant
outsider experience in Ontario or federally. We also interviewed 11 officials in the federal
government or another provincial government and 10 from other countries. These
interviews were used to provide context for Ontario and for the limited purpose of
checking for contradictory evidence. To the extent that our findings relate to other
jurisdictions, they emerged from a smaller number of interviews and a less systematic
approach to interview requests. Even for Ontario, the findings should be approached
with caution; they emerge from an apparently small but significant number of semirandom pieces collected from a large, multi-layered puzzle of government decisionmaking.
II. Findings
A. ISDS and government decision-making
Finding #1: Government ministries have changed their decision-making to
account for trade concerns including ISDS.

Detailed knowledge of ISDS was assumed for five interviewees from a trade ministry in Ontario or
another province, one from an environment-related Ontario ministry, one from the federal government,
two who were Ontario trade lawyers, and five from other countries.
19 F. Bechhofer, B. Elliot, and D. McCrone, “Safety in Numbers: On the Use of Multiple Interviewers”
(1984) 18 Sociology 97.
18
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It was clear that various ministries considered in their internal processes the risk of
ISDS claims under NAFTA and, more broadly, compliance with trade agreements. To
illustrate, a government lawyer in an environment-related ministry reported that trade
issues began to cross the lawyer’s desk after the early 2000s. Asked what trade issues
tended to come up, the lawyer pointed to the WTO and the ISDS provisions in NAFTA
Chapter 11, remarking that “Chapter 11 is the one that really bites”. The lawyer reported
reviewing one or two, sometimes three or four, proposals for legislation, a regulation, or
a policy each year for trade compliance. The lawyer said that this area of review
occupied a significant proportion of the lawyer’s time.20
A former official in the same environment-related ministry, who worked in a high-level
advisory role, was also aware of the risk of NAFTA ISDS claims. In response to a general
question about litigation risk in government, the former official said that NAFTA
Chapter 11 was an important consideration:21
Q How does what we’re referring to as litigation risk to government or state
liability – how if at all does that factor into [internal decision-making] alongside
other factors? And what degree of weight would be placed on it and what types of
litigation risk would we be talking about?
A: I would say that, first of all, there’s definitely an issue of litigation risk affecting
decision making and I’ll talk more about the types. The ones that come to mind
more readily for me are allegations around Chapter 11 claims under NAFTA as
opposed to the reality of whether those would be born out.
Later in the interview, the former official stated that NAFTA Chapter 11:22
was often raised as, you know, ‘we’re hearing from stakeholders about this, we
don’t know if we can do it, we’re worried, we might have to get an opinion….’ I
shouldn’t say quite often but sometimes policy measures were actually held up
while they got opinions about NAFTA or Chapter 11 risk.
The former official explained that the NAFTA concerns were raised by civil servants or
lawyers in the environment-related ministry and that the cited “stakeholders” could
have been colleagues in the provincial trade ministry or in industry. The former official
suspected the former.23
An official in the same ministry who worked on project approvals was asked if trade
implications under NAFTA or the WTO could be raised by a proponent when pressing

Interview with AH (25 March 2013).
Interview with AE (15 April 2011).
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
20
21
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for the approval of a project. The official said: “Yes I think it could. I absolutely think it
could.”24
An official in another environment-related ministry was asked specifically about ISDS
and regulatory change and whether government decision-makers are “really aware of
these mechanisms at all” and whether it is “realistic to think governments are actually
going to change their decisions”. The official replied: “I would say that yes, I think
there’s an awareness. I think there’s a desire to avoid those kinds of situations.”25
An official in another environment-related ministry who develops policy proposals was
asked generally about how proposals are vetted for legal risks. The official said:26
As a little policy shop, working with our colleagues in other ministries, we’ll sort
of float a particular proposal and then we’ll have our lawyers take a look at it and
they’ll sort of talk to their colleagues in the other ministries and just see like, okay
so is this something that’s feasible, does this get us into any trouble, is this in
keeping with the legislation on the books right now, is this in keeping with
current regulation, are we looking at any potential changes?
So you’re constantly working on narrowing down your set of options and every
option, I mean especially as we start getting down to our last few, they have to be
vetted by our legal folks.
A lawyer in the same ministry reported that the ministry had a small number of lawyers
who were trade law experts and that the ministry had been involved in NAFTA-related
situations.27
A well-placed source in the Ontario trade ministry said that other ministries would
sometimes contact the trade ministry for advice on how to design proposals in light of
trade issues. According to the source, the environment ministry was “one of our better
ministries in terms of the ones that refer things to us and they’ve been very loyal
followers of [the trade ministry’s] trade policy seminars”. The source added:28
So they are I think more aware of it than some others…. There are some
ministries that seem to have internalized their messages a little bit and can
actually act as a preliminary filter on their own. MOE [ministry of the
environment] is one of them.

Interview with AK (3 October 2013).
Interview with BP (14 July 2014).
26 Interview with BJ (28 March 2014).
27 Interview with BG (27 February 2014).
28 Interview with AF (15 April 2011).
24
25
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From a higher-level perspective, a former political advisor who had extensive access to
Ontario Cabinet decision-making stated:29
there’s always a legal analysis to anything… that goes up [to Cabinet] period, for
any kind of decision. So if there’s legal risk, you’re going to know about it. And if
it’s unknown, then they’re going to tell you about it. And a lot of trade law is done
that way.
The role of trade issues in internal decision-making was also flagged by officials in other
jurisdictions in Canada. A former federal Cabinet minister stated that, before a proposed
decision reached the stage of a minister bringing it to Cabinet or another ministry, there
was consideration of trade agreements and the risk of trade challenges. When asked
about the impact of threatened ISDS claims, the former minister clarified: “You don’t
have to be even threatened before it is a factor in your decision making process.”30
In another large Canadian province, a trade ministry official, who was interviewed with
two junior colleagues, said that proposed measures in that province were reviewed for
trade compliance on hundreds of occasions each year and that the trade ministry had a
team of a dozen people. The measures reviewed could include legislative, regulatory, or
policy changes or existing policies. According to the official: “Basically a trade lens is
applied through the Cabinet process” including for internal trade issues, WTO, and
NAFTA. When asked about NAFTA Chapter 11, the official said, “Absolutely it’s on the
radar”.31
This official also said that other ministries could review trade concerns without
involving the provincial trade ministry. The latter ministry would “only see issues when
investment experts in [another] ministry suggest it’s a good idea” and that “many times
we won’t see an investment proposal because it’s screened out by a ministry’s own
folks”. The official explained that there are informal and formal means to review trade
concerns and that, in most cases, the review takes the form of “an informal heads up on
thoughts and proposals” meaning that things can “get scuttled and shelved at an early
stage”. Formal reviews of proposals might be requested by a director, executive director,
or assistant deputy minister from another ministry.32
Another trade specialist in a ministry in a smaller province said that trade issues were
reviewed in the ministry’s advice to Cabinet. The exchange was as follows:33
A We’d look at the relevant trade agreement and what implications they have.

Interview with AX (22 November 2013).
Interview with BE (24 February 2014).
31 Interview with BK, BL, and BM (23 June 2014).
32 Ibid.
33 Interview with BN (11 July 2014).
29

30
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Q Do you look at the investment chapters of those agreements such as Chapter 11
of NAFTA? Does that come up at all?
A Yeah, where it’s relevant. And what our government does is, if we think there is
a particular issue, we will get outside expertise to assist in terms of providing that
advice to [specific name of provincial Cabinet].
In these interviews with trade officials from other jurisdictions, there were indications
that the context may differ from Ontario. At the federal level, apparently there was
earlier awareness of NAFTA Chapter 11 and a broader and more intensive process for
vetting measures for ISDS risks.34 In the other large province, the trade official thought
there was more Cabinet-level awareness of trade concerns in that province than Ontario;
in the smaller province, the official thought there was more sensitivity to trade issues in
the province because it was more trade-dependent than Ontario.35
Incidentally, it appeared that trade concerns can also affect non-governmental
organizations. Two interviewees commented that environmental groups must consider
trade concerns when proposing initiatives.36 Also, a lawyer for an environmental group
reported that conservation groups advocating for protection of the Peel watershed in the
Yukon had to deal with issues of potential government liability for injurious affection
(i.e. indirect expropriation) and propose ways to limit liability, though the lawyer did
not point specifically to NAFTA.37
Based on these and other responses from interviewees, it was clear that trade concerns
including ISDS are considered in the decision-making processes of environment-related
ministries in Ontario and elsewhere in Canada.
Finding #2: Government lawyers play a key role in assessing trade and ISDS
risks.
Various interviewees conveyed that trade and ISDS litigation risks are assessed mainly
by lawyers in the ministry or in other parts of the provincial government. For example, a
long-serving policy specialist in an environment-related ministry said that, for NAFTA,
lawyers would advise policy officials on whether there would be a real financial risk for
government, including for proposals with risks as low as in the thousands of dollars.38
On the general issue of litigation risk in government, the policy specialist replied as
follows about the role of lawyers in the ministry and in Cabinet Office:39
See the discussion of finding #3 below.
Interview with BK, BL, and BM (23 June 2014).
36 Interviews with AE and BA (3 and 10 December 2013).
37 Interview with AC (6 April 2011).
38 Interview with AZ (26 November 2013).
39 Ibid.
34
35
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Q Can you recall or imagine any situation where the prospect of judicial review,
or any other threat of litigation, would serve as a deterrent to going forward with
a particular decision?
A Sure. So first of all, I mean, I’m not a lawyer, so lawyers are going to give…
lawyers are involved in every decision. Believe me. And different branches of law.
So from those that are experts in legislation and policy to those that are involved
in defending claims against the threat of litigation and what not.
The policy specialist later replied to a more specific question on NAFTA and ISDS:40
Q So the lawyers judging what’s compliant or not with NAFTA have a major role,
kind of a gatekeeping role, on any initiatives?
A Yeah. And they would be tracking NAFTA cases, they would be tracking
decisions, even if decisions aren’t taken… Because you could spend a ton of
money defending yourself against a challenge, right? So again you’re better off
avoiding that situation, because money’s better spent on implementing your
things, whatever it is.
The policy specialist also explained:41
As a bureaucrat, it’s not something where I go: ‘How am I going to go through
this decision against NAFTA?’ I am going to say: ‘There are probably NAFTA
implications and we need some advice on how close to the edge of that NAFTA
line’.
A long-serving official in another environment-related ministry, who was based in a
regional office, told us that, if an outside party such as a company raised NAFTA as an
issue with the ministry, then the official would go to a lawyer in the regional office and,
after that, the issue could go to a more specialized lawyer in the ministry’s central
office.42
A lawyer in the same ministry said that there is an informal network of provincial
government lawyers who know about trade and investment law. The lawyer estimated
that (in and around the early 2010s) there were about ten such lawyers across Ontario
ministries, up from two or three in the early 2000s. The lawyers’ focus for trade issues
was the WTO and NAFTA and they would follow NAFTA ISDS cases that were relevant

Ibid.
Ibid.
42 Interview with BH (24 March 2014).
40
41
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to their field (e.g. environment) but not other ISDS cases; for the latter, they would rely
on federal trade lawyers.43
For litigation risk in general, a lawyer in another environment-related ministry said that
the ministry’s lawyers “look at policy submissions and advise whether they’re workable
from a legal perspective”. They “work right from the ground up”; that is, from initial
stages of development of a policy proposal to a ministry’s Cabinet submission. The
lawyer added that the lawyers’ role can go beyond strictly legal advice:44
I’ll be frank with you. In my view, our role…. as a government lawyer, sometimes
the line between law and policy is blurred a little bit…. A lot of lawyers here will
sometimes remark and may make comments that are more in the policy realm.
The government lawyers come and say, ‘well this doesn’t make sense’ or ‘how
would this work’, or even operational things, as we try to understand things.
The same lawyer indicated that the ministry ramped up its internal trade expertise in
the late 2000s.45
A former senior policy advisor in an environment-related ministry stressed the
importance of lawyers and of claims of legal expertise in internal discussions. The policy
advisor, who was a lawyer, described a dynamic where someone in the ministry “would
wave their hands at these kinds of issues [i.e. trade and ISDS] and say we can’t move”
but that the hand-waving did not have much impact because the minister at the time
was also a lawyer.46 In other words, because the minister was a lawyer, he or she was
able to evaluate skeptically the trade or ISDS concerns raised by bureaucrats.47
Yet the policy advisor also expressed a concern that, if the minister’s advisor was not
also a lawyer (and so able to evaluate claims of litigation risk critically) then the advisor
may be swayed before a proposal even reached the minister. According to the policy
advisor:48
It’s not the usual course to have a lawyer as policy advisor to the minister. So… it
may not even get as far as the Minister saying ‘I’m a lawyer and I’m not swayed’
because the policy advisor may not let it get that far when they’re swayed, right?
Further:
And my observation, having been there and seen the kinds of decisions that come
through, is that if you don’t have an extremely well-informed policy advisor
Interview with AH (25 March 2013).
Interview with BG (27 February 2014).
45 Ibid.
46 Interview with AE (15 April 2011).
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
43

44
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substantively on the issue – not just on this type of issue [NAFTA Chapter 11] but
on all the substantive issues they’re dealing with – you can well have a situation
where what they’re told by civil service is what they feel they have to go along
with, regardless of whether it’s true or not.
Other interviewees also indicated that legal advice can be critical in internal decisionmaking. After being asked specifically about ISDS and regulatory changes, a longserving policy official in an environment-related ministry said:49
As a bureaucrat at a line ministry you’re going to say, ‘I want to do it this way’.
The lawyer’s going to come back and say, ‘well I advise against it because it’s
going to be non-compliant with NAFTA’. So we’re going to go, ‘so how do I make
it compliant with NAFTA?’ And they go, ‘well if you change it to this way, that’ll
be compliant with NAFTA’.
Does that completely change how I do things? Yes, no, maybe? You’ll factor that
in and, 9 times out of 10, you’re going to go: ‘thanks that’s good advice, we’re
going to modify it’. So by the time it goes through, there is no conflict
controversy. Especially on those things where you’re trying to make a decision on
a new program or a new regulation.
However, the policy official also said that legal advice may not lead to changes in a
proposal:50
We might decide, thanks for your advice lawyers, we’re going to put that into the
bag and we’re going to consider it along with all of the other factors that we have
to consider. But not necessarily will it be the one factor that sways us from doing
one or the other.
This official then described NAFTA risks as one of many kinds of risk considered in
policy-making, others including social, reputational, financial, and sustainability risk.
A former federal government lawyer in an environment-related ministry said that the
ministry had increased its trade law expertise to be able to evaluate objections to
proposed regulations that were raised by the federal trade ministry. According to the
interviewee, when “the trade law people” provided an opinion that there was a problem
with a proposal:51
That would have a huge impact in any efforts to develop new regs [regulations].
That could put the brakes on anything. So it became a real question after that of

Interview with BP (14 July 2014).
Ibid.
51 Interview with AW (22 November 2013).
49
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um, really drilling down into those opinions and seeing that there actually was a
problem, or if this was all very very punched up.
A long-serving policy and project officer in the federal development ministry referred to
the role of government lawyers when involved in internal decisions. The official spoke of
development aid projects involving relations between the agency and outside actors and
not specifically about trade or ISDS risks. Even so, the official’s perspective helped to
illuminate the lawyer’s potentially powerful role:52
Q: And when the lawyers come in, is their advice, does their advice more or less
drive the decision making or is it just one factor among many?
A: No it tends to drive the decision making and it can be very annoying because
the lawyers are super cautious about protecting her majesty, so it generally is very
counterproductive developmentally, because we pretty much end up stopping the
initiative and we can also have some issues with souring relations, if it’s with the
partner country for instance. Um, but they are extremely conservative and
extremely risk-averse…
Finally, a former political advisor who had had extensive access to Ontario Cabinet
decision-making suggested that ISDS pressures on governments are dealt with primarily
by government lawyers. When asked about fiscal risks associated with NAFTA Chapter
11 lawsuits, the interviewee said: “If there’s a significant risk and a significant economic
impact associated with that risk, that’s going to have a huge impact”. The interviewee
then added:53
My view is that if you ask the average minister if there’s legal chill associated with
trade law, they’d probably say no because they’d probably never seen a decision
get to their desk where they’ve had to look at that. But if you asked---.
Q: They’re screened out?
A: Yeah. If you asked an honest lawyer working for government that regularly
assesses legal risk of that sort, if they were being honest, they would say that
there is.
Based on these comments, we found that the evaluation of trade and ISDS litigation risk
was part of a broader risk assessment that revolved around government lawyers. The
lawyers’ evaluation of such risks could be very significant in internal decision-making
and appeared to reflect a cautious, risk-averse approach.
B. ISDS and the provincial trade ministry
52
53

Interview with AT (15 November 2013).
Interview with AX (22 November 2013).
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Finding #3: The Ontario trade ministry has pushed to expand a centralized
regulatory assessment process for evaluating government decisions for
trade and ISDS risks.
From the interviews, we learned that the Ontario trade ministry works to ensure that
proposed decisions are reviewed internally from a trade perspective. The ministry’s
trade concerns arose from NAFTA, the WTO, and Canada’s Agreement on Internal
Trade.
The ministry pursues this goal in various ways. First, while many proposed decisions
would be reviewed for trade issues in the ministry that develops the proposal, the trade
ministry also evaluates some proposed decisions. Second, the trade ministry has pushed
to expand the vetting of government decision for trade issues, especially at the Cabinet
Office (the high-level bureaucratic office supporting Cabinet and reviewing ministry
proposals). Third, the trade ministry works to spread awareness about trade agreements
across the government.
As an illustration, a well-placed source in the Ontario trade ministry identified two
means by which specific proposals may be evaluated by the ministry. The first, involving
queries from another ministry, was described as follows:54
Usually things come to us in one of two ways. One is people in policy and legal
branches across the government think there might be some kind of trade angle to
a particular regulation that they’re passing, maybe because there’s a foreign
company that’s in the sector that might be affected. Or maybe because they went
to one of our training seminars years ago [where we] say: ‘You know, you
shouldn’t do things that kind of isolate individual companies that might be
perceived as discriminatory and I just want to flag that a little bit. So if you’re
passing something or thinking of passing something, just run it by us and we can
maybe provide the commentary.’
The second means was an evolving “trade policy screen” for proposals passing through
the Cabinet and other Ontario central agencies.55 The source described this means of
review:56
The other is that technically we lobby very hard to try and get what we call a trade
policy screen on Cabinet submissions and other kinds of proposals going through
to central agencies…. And every now and then we actually have somebody come
by and say, ‘well, you know, there might actually be a trade policy implication’,
Interview with AF (15 April 2011). The point was corroborated by another trade ministry source;
Interview with AD (15 April 2011).
55 Besides Cabinet Office, the other central agencies in the Ontario government are the Premier’s Office,
Management Board Secretariat, and the Ministry of Finance.
56 Interview with AF (15 April 2011).
54
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and they’ll come by, usually to [named person in the trade ministry] and [that
named person] will see a Cabinet submission or something like that.
A lawyer at an environment-related ministry said that the ministry refers proposals and
questions to the trade ministry for evaluation. The lawyer said, “Even though now we
have a couple lawyers who do trade, we still involve MEDT [Ministry of Economic
Development and Trade] throughout.” Indeed, the lawyer said that these consultations
were linked to an informal protocol between the lawyer’s ministry and the trade
ministry:57
… We are required through a sort of a protocol, so they’re the key legal opinion or
something on a trade issue. We still have to get it signed off by MEDT.
Q: Okay, so that would be sort of an inter-ministerial protocol, is that right?
A: Well I don’t know that it’s a formal written protocol but there’s certainly an
understanding that on key trade things, we need to consult with MEDT.
Q: So, if you identify, hmm this seems to involve trade, we’re going to go there.
A: Well, we’ll give a call to one of the lawyers over there, yeah.
For this second means of review, a source at the trade ministry said that the ministry’s
aim was for officials in the Cabinet Office to do a trade policy screen of any proposal
before it goes to Cabinet. The source also said that Cabinet Office liaison officials for
other ministries may be aware of trade issues and may refer another ministry’s proposal
to the trade ministry.58
However, the trade ministry did not itself review a large number of proposals coming
from other ministries, largely due to its limited size and resources. According to another
well-placed source in the trade ministry, the trade ministry’s main task was to work on
the NAFTA Chapter 11 cases against Canada that involved Ontario.59
Both sources in the trade ministry made it clear that the trade ministry wanted to
increase its role and both sources informed us of the ministry’s push to augment and
formalize vetting for trade issues across the government.60 This push, which both of the
sources supported, included the fairly recent establishment of a formal regulatory
assessment policy – including for trade issues – at the level of Cabinet and Cabinet

Interview with BG (27 February 2014).
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59 Interview with AD (15 April 2011).
60 Interviews with AD (15 April 2011) and AF (15 April 2011).
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Office.61 One of the sources confirmed that the policy was meant to capture ISDS risks
under the term “trade”.62
In contrast, a non-governmental policy specialist with many years’ experience in the
environmental field was critical of the expansion in the role of the Ontario trade
ministry. The policy specialist spoke in 2011 about the trade ministry taking part both
visibly and behind the scenes in consultations run by the Ontario environment ministry.
According to the policy specialist: “They are increasingly behaving, this is new… in the
last year… they are now behaving like a central agency…. It’s now been 20 years since
I’ve been doing this stuff – I’d never seen that in Ontario.”63
The policy specialist stressed that Ontario’s process of formal regulatory assessment was
historically much less developed than at the federal level:64
This is new stuff for them [the trade ministry]. And they don’t have the legal
capacity because they’re not a regulator, so they don’t have, to my knowledge, a
whole bunch of counsel who live and breathe this stuff and would be able to
present those kind of arguments in a compelling way.
Yet, according to the trade ministry sources, the consideration of trade issues appeared
to be increasingly formalized in the manner of the federal assessment process. This
development followed partly from the trade ministry pushing for more centralized
screening. On whether the new Ontario regulatory assessment policy was a step toward
more formalized consideration of trade implications, one trade ministry source said:65
That’s our hope. I mean we’re responsible for that regulatory policy [in
Ontario]…. Most important for us was to post draft regulations. Now
unfortunately they’re only Order in Council Regulations, they’re not Director’s
Orders or Minister’s Orders, but baby steps.
The source added that the trade ministry “is in charge of policing” the new regulatory
assessment policy and that it is part of a learning process in government. The trade
ministry’s aim was not that its dozen or so policy officials would review all proposed
regulations but that the Cabinet office “will start insisting on this”. Thus:66
Government of Ontario, “Ontario Regulatory Policy” (July 2014), available at:
https://www.ontariocanada.com/registry/downloads/Ontario%20Regulatory%20Policy.pdf (last visited
2 November 2015). We were told that the internal policy dated from 2010. See also J.V. DeMarco and T.
Vigod, “Smarter Regulation: The Case for Enforcement and Transparency” (2007), 17:2 Practice 85; M.
Winfield, “Environmental Governance in Canada: From Regulatory Renaissance to Smart Regulation”
(2006) 17:1 JEL&P 69.
62 Interview with AF (15 April 2011).
63 Interview with AG (14 April 2011).
64 Ibid.
65 Interview with AD (15 April 2011).
66 Ibid.
61
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through the informal consultations that people make… before they come to
Cabinet with a proposal, the Cabinet Office will be saying, ‘have you considered
this, this and this which is now in our regulatory policy and where is proof of the
consultations that have taken place?’ So it’s really the minders in the centre that
we hope will impose the discipline.
Trade ministry officials also sought to expand the role of trade considerations by
conducting training sessions for other government officials. According to a lawyer in an
environment-related ministry: “Our trade ministry has done a lot of sessions on what
the trade rules are, how to be consistent with them…. They do it for policy makers and
they do it for lawyers as well.”67
It was intriguing that the advice from trade ministry specialists (who were not
themselves lawyers) could be delivered to another ministry through legal advice given by
an intermediary government lawyer. That is, another ministry’s lawyer may use advice
from trade ministry specialists in the lawyer’s opinion to the other ministry. One source
at the trade ministry told us:68
They always think that we’re lawyers because – no offence – because only lawyers
are smart. And then when they find out you’re not a lawyer [laughter]. But mostly
our relationship is: you’re in the legal services branch [of a ministry], your client
wants advice, they want it now. Here’s somebody [in the trade ministry] who’s
willing to give them advice and then they just take it and they put it in their
opinion as their own. And that’s the way you solve the problem that we’re not
lawyers. That’s the way it has worked.
Even so, besides the trade ministry’s limited capacity, there were other limitations on
the trade ministry’s role in vetting proposals. A lawyer in an environment-related
ministry said that the reconciliation of trade and environmental issues was done more at
the lawyer’s ministry than at the trade ministry. The latter became involved “because
someone at the environment ministry thought it was a good idea to double check with
the trade ministry”.69
Thus, we found that the Ontario trade ministry plays an important but not allencompassing role in vetting proposals for trade and ISDS risks. Trade agreements and
ISDS boost the trade ministry’s internal position to some degree and the trade ministry
pushes for a greater role for itself and for trade concerns in internal decision-making.
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Finding #4: Some insiders saw the trade ministry and the regulatory
assessment process as creating undesirable obstacles for environmental
decision-making.
Several interviewees expressed this view when the topic of Ontario’s trade ministry
arose in the interview. As context for these perspectives, all of the interviewees would
have supported environmental initiatives to some degree, whether inside or outside
government. The perspectives contrasted with those of trade ministry sources, who
supported a greater role for trade concerns in government decision-making.
According to a former policy advisor in an environment-related ministry, “there are lots
of opportunities for things to stumble” in policy development, even without the formal
regulatory assessment process.70 The interviewee was suspicious that internal objections
to proposals, including ISDS objections, had come from bureaucrats in the trade or
environment-related ministry and not from industry, but were presented by the
bureaucrats as objections from outside stakeholders:71
I really noticed on some files, when I had a lot of familiarity with the stakeholders
[in industry], I knew darned well that stakeholders were not raising those issues
and that MEDT [the trade ministry] was raising issues that they thought their
stakeholders would or should raise.
Another long-serving former official in an environment-related ministry indicated that
the trade ministry was effectively an internal lobby for business. Commenting on local
disputes about water takings from stressed groundwater sources, the former official
said:72
The [trade ministry] oversees the interests of – they’re greasing the wheels within
government to make sure that these kinds of activities [here, water takings by
large bottled water companies] are allowed to continue unimpeded, without the
intervention of environmentalists or people inside ministries who have
progressive agendas.
A scientist in an environment-related ministry, who had had extensive exposure to
policy decision-making and was interested to ensure science-based decision-making for
environmental protection, indicated that the provincial trade ministry affected internal
decision-making and was very pro-business. On the other hand, the scientist said the
relevant environment-related ministry did not seem to have a non-business clientele to
counter pro-business tendencies in decision-making.73
Interview with AE (15 April 2011).
Ibid.
72 Interview with AI (1 October 2013).
73 Interview with BT (24 June 2011).
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Finally, an environmental lawyer who had not worked in government but had extensive
experience in relevant law and policy in Ontario saw regulatory assessment processes as
skewed toward industry. According to the lawyer: “There’s no shortage of opportunity
for those commercial or industrial sectors to make their views known before, during,
and after the regulatory decision is made”.74
These perspectives about the trade ministry highlighted that decisions about
government processes themselves, even before one gets to the merits of a specific
substantive decisions, reflect debates about how trade or foreign investor protection
should be weighed against other priorities. The underlying tension is not necessarily
resolved by trade agreements or ISDS rulings, leaving room for discretion and debate
among decision-makers confronted with a trade concern alongside an environmental
priority.
C. ISDS and institutional learning
Finding #5: A ministry’s concern for trade and ISDS became more acute
after the ministry was drawn into a NAFTA case, although institutional
learning about ISDS appeared variable and intermittent.
We heard that trade issues were more prominent in a ministry’s decision-making after
the ministry’s past role was the subject of a NAFTA case against Canada. A lawyer with
an environment-related ministry reported that, while NAFTA issues were considered as
hypotheticals in the early 2000s, the assessments became more real after the Gallo
claim against Canada, which involved an Ontario government decision.75
A lawyer with another environment-related ministry indicated that the ministry had
developed its own internal expertise in trade, in the form of two ministry lawyers who
now vet internal proposals, after the ministry became involved in one or more NAFTA
claims. According to the lawyer:76
Until we had these trade issues [i.e., involvement in specific cases] in this
portfolio, it’s not that frequent, but recently it’s been all consuming for two or
three lawyers within our branch… We’ve had to develop the trade expertise here
now, given that [the ministry’s portfolio] is very technical…. And because of that
we’ve had to develop an expertise in trade.
The lawyer also noted a greater attention to trade issues than other international issues:
“So we are more attuned to trade issues. But, in terms of other international issues and
international compliance, not so much.”77 Further, the lawyer said that the ministry’s
Interview with AZ (26 November 2013).
Interview with AH (25 March 2013).
76 Interview with BG (27 February 2014).
77 Ibid.
74
75
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liaison with the provincial trade ministry had increased in the same period: “Certainly
within this branch, it has increased a lot, I think, in the last three years…. There’s been
more profile given to the trade issues.”78
This finding was corroborated by a trade official from a smaller province who said that –
in the last few years and in light of recent NAFTA cases – “we have built in that trade
perspective much more deliberately”. Trade staff in the other large province reported
that the consideration of trade concerns had expanded since the early 2000s.79
This finding was also corroborated by sources at the federal level. Various interviewees
told us that the first NAFTA claim against Canada, the Ethyl case, in the late 1990s drew
much more attention to ISDS. One interviewee was a former federal Cabinet minister
who recalled the impact of the early NAFTA cases:80
Q: Do you think consideration of these things [trade concerns] became more
frequent and intense at a certain point of time or has it sort of always been that
way in your experience?
A: I think it became more intense after the NAFTA. I think that NAFTA was the…
I guess the watershed if you could put it that way, for more legalistic arguments
for companies to argue loss, the damage to future lost profits.
On the Ethyl case, in which the U.S. manufacturer of a gasoline additive called MMT
used NAFTA to challenge a federal ban on the additive, the former minister added:81
I remember talking about that [the MMT ban] in caucus. It sounded like a hell of
a great idea to me. It’s a health and safety issue to a certain extent. It’s an
environmental issue to a certain extent within our own country. It sounds like the
right thing to do. On that one, I don’t even know if the [NAFTA] implications at
the time were considered. But they sure as hell were considered afterwards.
Speaking of Ethyl, a non-governmental policy specialist who worked extensively with
federal environmental officials at the time said: “Once the MMT thing happened, the
universe changed and the trade lawyers inside the federal government, they had been
handed this hammer and they were not afraid to use it.”82
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Similarly, a former federal government lawyer in an environment-related ministry –
who by the time of Ethyl was no longer in government but kept relevant contacts on the
inside – said the case “was a shockwave”. The interviewee went on:83
I get a call from a friend of mine at [a federal environment-related ministry]…. I
pick up the phone, ‘Hi, how are you doing?’; ‘Never mind the social… What is
Chapter 11 of NAFTA and why are we being sued under it? I swear to God, that
was the conversation.
Finally, a former high-level policy advisor in the federal government at the time of
Ethyl, in the federal trade department, stated as follows:84
Q: So maybe if I can just turn to that example [the Ethyl case], do you recall how
inside government the knowledge of that settlement caused people to maybe shift
in their understanding of the role of NAFTA and so on?
A: Well absolutely, in my opinion, that really spooked officials and they became
very, in my view, intimidated by Chapter 11 challenges… So in my view it really
led to bad advice from officials in the sense that they were just really fearful of
developing any productive policy because they viewed that every policy would be
subject to some type of trade scrutiny and that Canada would lose.
Q: So when you say officials, do you mean the civil servants advising the political
decision-makers or are you speaking more broadly about officials?
A: When I say officials, I mean the bureaucracy, primarily the folks on the trade
side of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Q: So they were spooked by Chapter 11.
A: Absolutely.
Q: And they were spooked because they feared losing?
A: Correct.
However, it also appeared, at least in the Ontario government, that a government’s
accounting for ISDS risks could be variable and intermittent. A source at the Ontario
trade ministry commented on the lack of institutional memory:85
One of the things about government is that people will make the same mistakes
again and again and again because there’s so much rotation of senior
Interview with AW (22 November 2013).
Interview with AM (8 October 2013).
85 Interview with AF (15 April 2011).
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management…. A lot of lessons don’t stay because people don’t stay and there’s
not a lot of mobilized institutional memory.
A policy specialist with an environment-related ministry noted the role played by
lawyers – in the ministry, in Cabinet, or at another ministry such as trade – who were
involved in a past case and who: “can kind of go, stop, I’ve seen this movie before. This is
where we’re heading. This is what it’s going to mean. And they’ll always just say, are you
prepared to make that decision?”86
Some interviewees also pointed to reasons for Ontario officials to downplay trade
concerns. A reason mentioned by various interviewees was the view that the WTO and
NAFTA are a federal and not a provincial responsibility. A trade ministry source put it
this way:87
There’s also [the view that] well the federal government entered into these
agreements. It’s not really for us…. If we get into trouble, we don’t have to deal
with it. It’s the lawyers that have to deal with it. They just go away quietly and
deal with it. It’s even further than that, it’s the federal government that’s going to
have to deal with it.
As a way to raise awareness about trade and ISDS, the source expressed some desire for
Canada to lose cases that involved Ontario government decisions:88
I would agree that there needs to be something that’s seen as more significant in
order for people to take it seriously, yeah. And I think because most of the
challenges we faced in a trade situation have been relatively small, they haven’t
been really damaging, people haven’t felt that they’ve had to pay attention to it.
In particular, the source said that it would be positive if Canada lost the then-ongoing
Gallo case and if the award against Canada was for a lot of money:89
If we’re going to lose [the Gallo case], I hope we lose big… $15 million – that’s
kind of a rounding error, you know?
Q So a big loss would be good because it would deter those kinds of bad policy
decisions?”
A At least it would draw the attention of the Ministry of the Attorney General and
others around the system to advise differently if a similar kind of measure was
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coming up. There’s nothing to guarantee that that advice would be taken, but at
least the advice would be offered.
In contrast, a lawyer with an environment-related ministry reacted positively to
Canada’s successful defence, by that point, in Gallo and hoped that, with a few more
such cases, ISDS claims would dissipate: “It’s been decided and decided in our favour,
which is awesome”; “…luckily we won with Gallo so all we need is a couple other wins
and these things will go away”.90
Thus, while the lawyer preferred Canada to win NAFTA cases in order to deter ISDS
claims, the trade official preferred Canada to lose in order to augment the consideration
of ISDS risks. These differing views hinted at tensions and conflicting values in internal
decision-making, though these tensions and conflicts are mostly beyond the scope of
this article.
D. ISDS and specific cases
Finding #6: Officials typically declined to discuss specific cases or
decisions.
Over the course of the interviews, it emerged that it was not realistic to access in-depth
information about particular decisions affected by trade vetting. Trade and ISDS
concerns clearly were sometimes considered but it was unclear how the concerns
impacted specific decisions.
For example, when asked about the specifics of NAFTA and ISDS and whether they
impacted decisions, a policy advisor in an environment-related ministry replied: “you
know, it definitely has an impact on our thinking about how we go forward” but did not
respond directly when asked about potential chill on regulation, saying:91
“That’s a really good conversation to have with the environmental regulators. If
you can get yourself a conversation with those folks, I think that you’d get some
very interesting perspectives and, you know, I mean, that’s as much as I’ll say on
that.”
In declining to discuss specifics, the policy advisor also said: “this is a very risk averse
organization… they don’t even like it when we talk about stuff.”92
A lawyer at an environment-related ministry highlighted a particular need for
confidentiality when discussing decisions that had not led to an ISDS claim. The reason
was to safeguard against litigation risk: “You don’t want to talk about things that maybe
Interview with AH (25 March 2013).
Interview with BJ (28 March 2014).
92 Ibid.
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didn’t turn into something. Something is done and it’s in the newspaper, we can talk
about it freely. It’s done… that’s in the public domain.”93
Similarly, a trade ministry source declined to speak about specific examples involving
the environment ministry. When asked about the Gallo case and whether underlying
decisions had been vetted for trade concerns, the source said: “I know the exact answer
to that but I don’t know if I’m allowed to say under the confidentiality agreement.”94 As
well, a former political advisor who had extensive access to Cabinet decision-making
declined to speak about what happened on any specific files.95
Staff in the trade ministry of another large province also declined to speak about
specifics of the proposals reviewed for trade implications.96 The trade specialist in a
smaller province did the same, indicating on the issue of disclosing information about
the ministry’s internal vetting that: “Our problem is obviously there may be risks that we
have identified that we certainly have identified as risks that could get triggered….”97
When interviewees expressed a preference not to speak about specifics, we did not press
them, turning instead to a discussion of information that would support general
findings.
At times, it proved difficult to speak to government lawyers. A legal director in one
Ontario ministry denied access to several lawyers working in the ministry who were
approached for an interview, even on the understanding that matters of solicitor-client
privilege would not be discussed. The lack of access to a wide range of lawyers, who
evidently played a prominent role in vetting proposals, limited our ability to learn how
specific decisions were affected by trade and ISDS concerns. As we heard from a nongovernmental policy specialist who was familiar with government decision-making:98
The problem is you have a paper trail per se is limited with this stuff. It’s all
conversations at meetings or stuff that might have come in a memo, but you can
never get it because it would be considered legal advice to government anyway.
In turn, the limited access to lawyers and to specific ISDS risk assessments precluded a
comprehensive or representative review of the frequency of ISDS risk assessments, the
weight given to the risks, the content of the assessments, or the merits of resulting
specific changes to proposed decisions.
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Finding # 7: Officials referred occasionally to specific situations where
trade or ISDS concerns were considered and, in some cases, where they led
to changes to a specific proposal.
About half of the interviews from Canada recalled one or a few situations in which ISDS
or other trade concerns were raised in internal decision-making. However, interviewees
usually declined to discuss or were unable to recall details. Also, the ISDS or trade
concerns seemed to be one of multiple factors affecting how officials approached a
decision. Thus, examples of vetting of specific decisions emerged but, without extensive
investigative research, it was unclear how a decision was changed. We have identified
below a few examples of such reports.


A long-serving former environmental official in Ontario recalled seeing references to
trade issues in legal opinions from the trade ministry on the environment ministry’s
proposals for a very small tax on water takings (instead of a more restrictive policy to
conserve water) or “water charges” in Ontario.99 The official said that trade concerns
arose in a discussion of policies on low water response and water bottling. Similarly,
a former policy advisor at an environment-related ministry said that trade concerns,
especially NAFTA Chapter 11, were considered for proposals on water takings, after
the concerns were raised by the provincial trade ministry in opposition to proposals
for water charges and on behalf of “the water bottlers of this world”. The concerns
were evaluated by the environment-related ministry and eventually considered low
risk because the amounts of water charges had been kept very low.100



Two interviewees in government and three in environmental organizations said that
the threat of a NAFTA ISDS lawsuit, as part of an industry lobbying campaign
against a proposed ban on cosmetic use of pesticides, did not deter Ontario from
adopting a strong ban because, by that point, the government was highly committed
to the legislation, was supported by mainstream health and environmental groups,
and had broad public support.101



A former high-level policy advisor in the federal trade department said that trade
considerations were “the driver to the whole process” for the federal government’s
decision not to introduce a national prohibition on the bulk removal of water from
Canadian waterways (and instead pursue a weaker option).102 The source said: “they
were concerned that, if bulk water approvals were permitted to American firms, that
would make them susceptible to fair treatment claims by other corporations that
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wanted to enter the Canadian market….” and that “the federal government never
came out and took a strong stand on this issue because they were afraid of the
ramifications from an international trade perspective and the elevation of risk for
Canada of stating something strongly and categorically.”103 Three sources in the
Ontario government also mentioned more obliquely that trade concerns were
considered on the issue of bulk water exports from Canada.104
We suspect that there may be some cases where an outside researcher, with limited
resources and no formal investigative powers, will be able to identify situations in which
ISDS risks were a predominant factor in the evolution of a proposed decision. However,
in most cases, if ISDS risks are a factor, we expect they will have played an
indeterminate role as part of a mix of factors affecting that evolution.
Along these lines, some interviewees conveyed that trade and ISDS concerns operate “in
the background” and that they have a subtle effect on decision-making. The point was
made among others by a former federal minister:105
Q: So one more question. And you might not be able to answer it, but can you
remember any specific files where the trade agreement was a really significant
factor, saying okay we’re not going to go ahead with this?
A: Don’t think so. There’s none that comes to mind. You’d think I’d remember
something like that. No, I don’t think so. It was always, the trade agreements and
their impact on decision making was often more subtle. Yes it would be in some
of the memorandums to Cabinet, but it was always just kind of a subtle thing that
was there. You know, we should be aware of this.
Q: So it’s kind of built in.
A: Yeah, it’s kind of built in, it’s kind of the reality of the world. It’s one of the
factors you’d have to consider. And I do think it affects decision making more
than even those that are making the decisions realize. I think it affects how you
think….. You’re weighing it against, before you even make a decision, against the
implications of a trade agreement that’s going to affect how you make that
decision.
Conclusion
Our findings revolve around the question of whether governments, especially in relation
to environmental protection, have changed their decision-making due to ISDS. They
elaborate on how decisions are vetted internally and to the role played by government
Ibid.
Interviews with AD (15 April 2011), AF (15 April 2011), and AH (25 March 2013).
105 Interview with BE (24 February 2014).
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lawyers and trade officials in the vetting process. The findings also highlight the
challenges of investigating specific decisions linked to ISDS.
Besides the limitations noted earlier in this paper, we emphasize that our findings are
not exhaustive. We have prioritized reporting of the findings presented here because
they were widely-supported by our interviews and reveal a phenomenon of internal
vetting not previously examined in the literature. In other publications, we plan to
elaborate findings on these further issues:


Dynamics of internal vetting: incentives that ISDS creates in government, forms of
ISDS risk assessment, value choices in ISDS risk assessment, and how ISDS appears
to shift decision-making in favour of certain actors.



Institutional context for internal vetting: locations in government where ISDS risks
appear to be assessed, impact on the trade ministry’s position within government,
and ISDS issues in a federalist system of government.



Impacts of internal vetting: prospect that ISDS risks will have less impact for
governments that are not active in the environmental field, circumstances that may
help a proposed decision to proceed despite ISDS risks, prospect that governments
may conceal information on ISDS impacts, and utility and limitations of ISDS for
foreign investors.

These further issues and findings are premised on the core findings reported here that
ISDS has led to internal vetting of proposed decisions in government and that some
officials have a greater role in the vetting process than others do. We suggest that these
findings are relevant to an evaluation of the impact of ISDS for governments and the
public.
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